THE Second World War is already in its fifth month. There has never been a great European war in which' the moral issue was clearer, more sharpl y defined. The r~gime in Germany has been guilty of acts of oppression, brutality, and intolerance withou t parallel since the Middle Ages. The Christian Church, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, has been openly assailed . Christianity itself has been attacked; the Bible denounced as Jewish; Wotan and the cult of the German blood substituted for Christian worship. Freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of investigation in the social sciences have been brought practically to. an end. This new "culture" and Hcivilization" are n,Ow to be extended to Europe and then to the world at large. The attempt to conquer Europe has already made progress : Austria, the Sudeten, Bohemi a and Moravia, half of Poland have been annexed to the Third Reich. To all of these the blessings of intolerance, of Fascism, and of the goose step are being transferred. The Second World War is being fought to bring this r~gime to an end and to res tore in Europe the reign of peace, of law, of liberty, and of democracy. The moral aims of the wa r are crystal clear.
policies, either in theory or in practice. Its worst feature was its oppressive and far-reaching foreign poticy. The Second World War finds in .Germany a regime hostile to the future of progress in the world on both counts. Its repressive domestic policy is, if anything, worse than its aggressive foreign policy.
But are the two wars related I Has the first Pan-Germanism given birth to a second? Or is the resemblance' purely superficial and casuall .Historians are charged with drawing parallels and comparisons between unrelated events, of looking for causes which are not there, and of discovering relationships too subtle for other than historically trained minds to see. They have probably overdone the matter more than once and no doubt will again. One like myself who declared a certain interpretation of German history true before and during the First World War finds himself tempted to' continue the same line of thought as that of least resistance and must continually beware of forc ing present facts into old moulds and or interpreting modern history too much on the basis of the idea that history repeats itself. In a literal sense, history has never repeated itsel f: the differences are always numerous and st ri king. In another sense, history frequently repeats itsel f because man as a thinking animal thinks slowly and ineffectually and seems almost incapable of new thoughts and devices. Nevertheless, I do feel that history has much to tell us about this present war.
If I am not too academic, I must insist that one of history's greatest lessons teaches us that a war must not be fought upon a wrong analysis of the 5i tuation. The causes must be correctly grasped to make intelligible the issues of the war, and the issues must be crystal clear or no solution of them at the end will be found. I n other .words, unless the All ies see clearly and truly what is the problem to be solved, there will be no vic· tory. To be explicit, this war is fought to get rid of Hitler and his group. Unless they are themselves the true cause of the war, its ollly cause, the war will be lost and victory sacrificed if the war ends and merely removes them. The cause will not have been removed; the disease will not have been cured. Unltss they were tM chief or sole cause! But if they should not be! If other forces should be important and not reaJized, the result is serious jf not catastrophic. The true analysis of a si tuation has meaning for the statesman as welJ as for a mere professional historian. A statesman must not make mistakes in policy, but not so many people realize that policy 126 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY policies, either in theory or in practice. Its worst feature was its oppressive and far-reaching foreign poticy. The Second World War finds in .Germany a regime hostile to the future of progress in the world on both counts. Its repressive domestic policy is, if anything, worse than its aggressive foreign policy. But are the two wars related I Has the first Pan-Germanism given birth to a second? Or is the resemblance' purely superficial and casuall .Historians are charged with drawing parallels and comparisons between unrelated events, of looking for causes which are not there, and of discovering relationships too subtle for other than historically trained minds to see. They have probably overdone the matter more than once and no doubt will again. One like myself who declared a certain interpretation of German history true before and during the First World War finds himself tempted to' continue the same line of thought as that of least resistance and must continually beware of forc ing present facts into old moulds and or interpreting modern history too much on the basis of the idea that history repeats itself. In a literal sense, history has never repeated itsel f: the differences are always numerous and st ri king. In another sense, history frequently repeats itsel f because man as a thinking animal thinks slowly and ineffectually and seems almost incapable of new thoughts and devices. Nevertheless, I do feel that history has much to tell us about this present war.
If I am not too academic, I must insist that one of history's greatest lessons teaches us that a war must not be fought upon a wrong analysis of the 5i tuation. The causes must be correctly grasped to make intelligible the issues of the war, and the issues must be crystal clear or no solution of them at the end will be found. I n other .words, unless the All ies see clearly and truly what is the problem to be solved, there will be no vic· tory. To be explicit, this war is fought to get rid of Hitler and his group. Unless they are themselves the true cause of the war, its ollly cause, the war will be lost and victory sacrificed if the war ends and merely removes them. The cause will not have been removed; the disease will not have been cured. Second World War is an attempt to redeem the failure to achieve the objects of German policy in the First World War. The same fa cts made familiar then reappear now: the encirclement of Germany by her "aggressive" and "imperialistic" neighbours; Pan-Germanism in its purest sense, the fe-annexation by Germany of the Germans living outside its political -frontiers; the need for raw materials; the need for markets; the necessity of colonies .
Germany again appears strangled by the Briti sh /leet, cramped in Europe by the position of the British Isles, overpowered in the · world by the British Empire. As the song of hate against England was sung in German music halls in 1914 amid cheers of appro-is often based on history and that it was his history and not what they caU his policy which was really at fault_ Second World War is an attempt to redeem the failure to achieve the objects of German policy in the First World War. The same fa cts made familiar then reappear now: the encirclement of Germany by her "aggressive" and "imperialistic" neighbours; Pan-Germanism in its purest sense, the fe-annexation by Germany of the Germans living outside its political -frontiers; the need for raw materials; the need for markets; the necessity of colonies .
Germany again appears strangled by the Briti sh /leet, cramped in Europe by the position of the British Isles, overpowered in the · world by the British Empire. As the song of hate against England was sung in German music halls in 1914 amid cheers of appro-bation, so the new song has appeared to give the key to th e present war feeling-"When We Sail for England." While there exist many differences, the Pan-Germanism of the First World War is. mo re nearly thall a great many people are going to like to believe, being revived today. It is, therefore, in ~he great tendencies of Prussian and German history that the fundamental causes of this present war lie.
Beyond much doubt, another cause is to be found in th e fact that Germany was defeated but neither weakened nor crushed in ' 1918. Even the army was not destroyed. Germany as a nation emerged from the war stronger relatively t han did the victors. Not for the first time did the vanquished emerge from a great European conflict less damaged than the conquerors. F"anee lost by far the most heavily. One-third of France was practically destroyed. t he bulk of it just before the .rmistice as a mfre act of vandalism so that her territory shou ld be returned t o her desolate. ln the First World War Ger many was defeated but was ' It has been common to say-all too common-that th e cause of t he present war is the Treaty of Versailles, which humiliated Germany, roused her national feeling therefore, and imposed upon her terms which were criminal in the extreme. I do not believe that there is in this contention any truth whatever. T . hat Treaty was certainly not the worst ~ver made, nor was it the cause of Hitler's r~gime nor of the present war in any such sen se as is usually meant. It is, ho wever, distinctly related to thi s conflict, for phases or it created t he situation ou t of which Hitler was able to develop the war. These phases were not those penalizing Germany, but unfortunately those which intended to estab li sh democracy and Beyond much doubt, another cause is to be found in th e fact that Germany was defeated but neither weakened nor crushed in ' 1918. Even the army was not destroyed. Germany as a nation emerged from the war stronger relatively t han did the victors. Not for the first time did the vanquished emerge from a great European conflict less damaged than the conquerors. F"anee lost by far the most heavily. One-third of France was practically destroyed. t he bulk of it just before the .rmistice as a mfre act of vandalism so that her territory shou ld be returned t o her desolate. ln the First World War Ger many was defeated but was ' It has been common to say-all too common-that th e cause of t he present war is the Treaty of Versailles, which humiliated Germany, roused her national feeling therefore, and imposed upon her terms which were criminal in the extreme. I do not believe that there is in this contention any truth whatever. T . hat Treaty was certainly not the worst ~ver made, nor was it the cause of Hitler's r~gime nor of the present war in any such sen se as is usually meant. It is, ho wever, distinctly related to thi s conflict, for phases or it created t he situation ou t of which Hitler was able to develop the war. These phases were not those penalizing Germany, but unfortunately those which intended to estab li sh democracy and liberty in Eastern Europe. Because Germany had been defeated but was neither destroyed nor ~even weakened, it was apparent ·to the Allied statesmen that some steps must be taken to prevent at leas t an immediate recurrence of the conflict. The one practical idea was in truth not practical. It promised little but was adopted because there seemed to be no other alternative. Austria-Hungary had bee;, broken up before the armistice by its own subject peoples, all of whom ardently desired political independence. Many other groups in East ern Europe had for generations sought political independence and saw now a golden opportunity to secure it. A series of buffer states, as they were called, was accOI'dingly erected in Eastern Europe in the hope that they might oppose Germany all. the one side and Russia all. the other. In order to give them strength and economic independence, as much territory as possible was comprehended within their frontiers, and they were perforce created out of areas previously in the old Austria-Hul,gary, in the old Russia, and in Germany herself. The purpose was perhaps .in the minds of some to weaken Germany, but the clear idea of the majority of negotiators at VersaiHes was to satisfy the national aspirations of numbers of European peoples hitherto oppressed.
Nevertheless, in an endeavour to accomplish what seemed then to the worJd at large a laudable purpose, territory was taken from Germany and from Russia. In some very real sense, the recovery of this territory is one of the objects of the present war. Danzig, the Poli sh Corridor, the old Province of Posen, Upper Silosia were thus lost in 1919 by Germany. Russia hasten ed to seize once more this autumn territory taken from her in 1919.
The new buffer states gave Germany an opportunity of which the R epublic was either unable or unwilling to avail itself, but which Hitler has appreciated and which he has utilized to the full .
The new states unfortunately were themsdves not nations, but mere conglomerates possessing ·no racial or political unity, no com.moll tradition of administration or law, no common patriotic aspiration. They suffered (rom th e first (rom internal weakness, and 'in most of them ci vil war was narrowly averted from time to time. Unfortunately) too J they were hostile to each other, suspected each other of conspiracies and plots, and presented to Nazi Germany no united front as nations and no compact, wellorganized units as independent states. It was possible for this reason for Hjt~er to play upon their mutual antipathies) to negotiate Nevertheless, in an endeavour to accomplish what seemed then to the worJd at large a laudable purpose, territory was taken from Germany and from Russia. In some very real sense, the recovery of this territory is one of the objects of the present war. Danzig, the Poli sh Corridor, the old Province of Posen, Upper Silosia were thus lost in 1919 by Germany. Russia hasten ed to seize once more this autumn territory taken from her in 1919.
The new states unfortunately were themsdves not nations, but mere conglomerates possessing ·no racial or political unity, no com.moll tradition of administration or law, no common patriotic aspiration. They suffered (rom th e first (rom internal weakness, and 'in most of them ci vil war was narrowly averted from time to time. Unfortunately) too J they were hostile to each other, suspected each other of conspiracies and plots, and presented to Nazi Germany no united front as nations and no compact, wellorganized units as independent states. It was possible for this reason for Hjt~er to play upon their mutual antipathies) to negotiate with the racial malconten ts in all of them, and to secure a direct assistance in Austria, the Sudeten, Slovakia, Danzig, and var ious parts of Poland, which greatly' facilitated his annexations. In this sense the Treaty of Versailles was one of the fundamen tal causes of the present war, not because it humiliated Germany, weakened her as a nation, or destroyed her position in Europe, but becau se it provided a fertile field in which the seeds of discontent and co nspiracy were sown.
It is regrettable that the people of the Allied countries are themselves in some measure responsi ble for the present war, are themselves guilty of creating a situation which gave H itler a tremendous advantage. No sooner was the First World War over than German y began plans for one of the most elaborate efforts of prop~ganda ever made in his tory. Its principal achievement was the publicat ion in many volumes of Die Grosse Polilik, ostensibly t he frank confession by a repentant republican Germany of the diplomatic sins committed by the Kaiser and other German statesmen since 1870. This and large num bers of other books, apparently serious in purpose and critical in character, su ccessfully created the belief even in the Allied countries that Germany was not solely guilty of the World War; that she was guilty, if at all, onl y in a somewhat greater sense than France, Ru ssia, and Great Br itain . rhe idea came to he accepted that Germany had been hardly dealt with after the War because she had been believed guilty. She had been unjustly blamed ; she had suffered too much; she had been un necessarily hu miliated; she had indeed heen wrongly humiliated.
The natural result was the acceptance hy public opinion pretty generally throughout the Allied nations, and in neutral states, that some concessions at least to Germany would be wise and, after all, no more than just. If Germany had suffered tOO much, a balance should be struck . If she had been. unduly weakened, some terri torial changes would not be unfair or unreasonable.
If she had been too drastically disarmed, an increase in the German army was even desirable. This opinion went far to secu re for Br itain . rhe idea came to he accepted that Germany had been hardly dealt with after the War because she had been believed guilty. She had been unjustly blamed ; she had suffered too much; she had been un necessarily hu miliated; she had indeed heen wrongly humiliated. The natural result was the acceptance hy public opinion pretty generally throughout the Allied nations, and in neutral states, that some concessions at least to Germany would be wise and, after all, no more than just. If Germany had suffered tOO much, a balance should be struck . If she had been. unduly weakened, some terri torial changes would not be unfair or unreasonable. Germany and the restoration of conscription. It permitted him the following March, again without OPPOSItIon, to reoccupy the Rhineland. P ro bably this moment was the most important III recent years. It was the turn of the tide. After it, nearly all that has happened was logical and even simple. Resistance should have been made to the reoccupation of the Rhineland and a . halt there called to Hitler's policy. But the general public opinion in England and France at that time would probably not have accepted or permitted any attack upon the ~h in eland.
If she had been too drastically disarmed, an increase in the German
It seemed, in view of the great propaganda of the preceding fifteen years, a concession which ought as a matter of fact to be . made to a weak, humiliated, and struggling nation. At the time the most popular view outside Germany gave the Hitler r~gime only from thue to six mon ths longer to live. There was no essential danger in what was going on. The regime itself could not last . Changes were no dou bt also made easier because there had never been any idea at VersaiUes that the disarmament of Germany would be, cou ld be, or should be permanen t, nor that the German armies should be kept out of the Rhineland the moment it became clear that any reopening of the war was no longer intended. How far on this latter point they were wrong! Besides, Hitler was vastly aided by the recovery of Russia, the apparent success of the Five Year Plan s, the gathering strength of the Soviet regime, all believed for years impossible. The menace of Hitler seemed at the time far less than the menace of Communism. Indeed, a not inconsiderable element of British political opinion, with some adherents in' high places, held that the wisest thing to do was to strengthen Hitler so that Germany might be prepared to defend herself against a .. Communi st revolution bent upon the conquest of all Europe. To this view the successes of the Popular Front in France and in Spain lent colour. Communi sm was gaining and some talk actually occurred at the time of the necessity of an alliance between Great Britain and Germany to oppose it. Of COUIse, later events were by no means foreseen. But the acceptance of the version of German history prese nted b)" the propagandists did in direct and vital ways facilitate the firs t and all-important moves of the Nazi regime. Thu s was created the basis for future success.
There followed two years of unparalleled aggression and faithlessness to treaties and promises, and the acts and results of these years are undoubtedly the immediate cause of the presen t war. They convinced Hitler that everything was possi bl e, provided that it was undertaken a step at a time. They convinced the recent years. It was the turn of the tide. After it, nearly all that has happened was logical and even simple. Resistance should have been made to the reoccupation of the Rhineland and a . halt there called to Hitler's policy. But the general public opinion in England and France at that time would probably not have accepted or permitted any attack upon the ~h in eland.
There followed two years of unparalleled aggression and faithlessness to treaties and promises, and the acts and results of these years are undoubtedly the immediate cause of the presen t war. They convinced Hitler that everything was possi bl e, provided that it was undertaken a step at a time. They convinced the greater part of the .rest of the world that no more must be permitted if the domination of Europe by Germany and the establishment in it of a regime of oppression and brutaJity was to be avoided. The annexation of Austria in March, ]938, was accompanied by the most explicit and definitive assurances to all surrounding states that no further steps were intended.· Czechoslovakia in particular was offered Hitler's most solemn guarantee of her integrity. Six months later at Munich it became obvious that his promises were worthless. The Sudeten was yielded to him and once more he pledged to respect the integrity of the remainder of that nation for the rest of time. I t was, he solemnly assured the world, his last territorial demand in Europe. Partly because Great Britain and France believed him, partly because Mr Chamberlain was firmly convinced that the alternative was a European war, the Munich Pact was signed.
Once again the futility of believing any assurances, however solemn, made by Hitler or his ministers was demonstrated.. Six months later, Bohemia and Moravia were annexed. This act utterly changed the· situation. Hitherto all the states of Eastern Europe, in particular Hungary and Poland, had not hesitated to negotiate with Hitler or to oppose him, firm in the conviction that under all circumstances their independence was completely assured. Hitler wished Pan-Germanism, the annexation to Germany of all Germans, the expulsion from Germany of all non-German elemen ts. He wished to establish a purely racial state and to this end wished to rid Germany not merely of the Jews but of aJl other elements which were no~ definitely Nordic, Aryan, or German, whichever phrase is correct. Under no circumstances did he wish Slavs in Germany. Inasmuch as Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the rest were overwhelmingly non-Germanic, they did not believe that a.ny risk whatever existed of conquest or annexation. It was not, in view of Hitler's past policies, to say nothing of his book, thinkable for a moment.
Partly because these states of Eastern Europe so firmly believed this idea, partly because the statesmen of other nations themselves thought it true, the rest of Europe felt that in the main no danger existed of a literal conquest by Germany of Eastern Europe. The annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, Slav states, opened at once a vast and terrifying prospect. . Hitler had been misunderstood, if indeed he had not intended to be misunderstood. 132 THE UNJVERSJTY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY greater part of the .rest of the world that no more must be permitted if the domination of Europe by Germany and the establishment in it of a regime of oppression and brutaJity was to be avoided. The annexation of Austria in March, ]938, was accompanied by the most explicit and definitive assurances to all surrounding states that no further steps were intended.· Czechoslovakia in particular was offered Hitler's most solemn guarantee of her integrity. Six months later at Munich it became obvious that his promises were worthless. The Sudeten was yielded to him and once more he pledged to respect the integrity of the remainder of that nation for the rest of time. I t was, he solemnly assured the world, his last territorial demand in Europe. Partly because Great Britain and France believed him, partly because Mr Chamberlain was firmly convinced that the alternative was a European war, the Munich Pact was signed.
Partly because these states of Eastern Europe so firmly believed this idea, partly because the statesmen of other nations themselves thought it true, the rest of Europe felt that in the main no danger existed of a literal conquest by Germany of Eastern Europe. The annexation of Bohemia and Moravia, Slav states, opened at once a vast and terrifying prospect. . Hitler had been misunderstood, if indeed he had not intended to be misunderstood.
Conquest apparently was planned and was apparently only too possible. The result was the determination of Great Britain and France to oppose with arms in the :field and on the sea, to their utmost, any further step of any kind. No further aggrandizement could be permitted; no promises or assurances from Hitler 01" his ministers could be of the slightest value. They made the issue clear to Hitler and he nevertheless forced .the war. He understood that he was precipitating a European war when he did it. The act was so understood in Great Britain and France. It seems even true that a sigh or relief was breathed by the French and British people when they learned that the issue was at last joined and that there would be no more compromises nor peaceful acceptance of his aggression.
Is it straining historic parallels to see in this narrative far more than Hitler and the Nazi leaders? Does he not himself reflect and represent German tendencies and policies which have a long history? Has he not revived past policies? Does he not plan an extent and character of aggression which would have gladdened the heart of Frederick the Great or of Baron vom und 2um Stein? Much was written in the First World War about the long history of Prussian aggression. Little has been said about it for the last fifteen years, bu t were our predecessors wholly wrong?
Looking back twenty-five years to the First World War.leads one who lived through it as a professional student and commentator to more thoughts than call possibly be expressed in an article, but there are OLle or two ideas in relation to it which are germane to this present inquiry. There has been in Britain and France, and quite clearly, too, in the British Empire, a movement favouring the present definition o( Allied war aims. The Allies had already announced that they would fight until the Na2i regime in Germany was ended, the aggressive conquests of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland redressed, and a new order of peace assured in Europe. The general aims could hardly be more clearly stated. But no hint even has yet been" given as to what exact concessions by Germany would satisfactorily establish a new order in Europe and guarantee liberty and democracy. The detailed ideas which would satisfactorily achieve the purposes of the Allies, many have felt, should be stated now, partly because they would make clearer, for the general public in the Allied countries exactly what the armies are fighting (or and partly in the hope that negotiations Conquest apparently was planned and was apparently only too possible. The result was the determination of Great Britain and France to oppose with arms in the :field and on the sea, to their utmost, any further step of any kind. No further aggrandizement could be permitted; no promises or assurances from Hitler 01" his ministers could be of the slightest value. They made the issue clear to Hitler and he nevertheless forced .the war. He understood that he was precipitating a European war when he did it. The act was so understood in Great Britain and France. It seems even true that a sigh or relief was breathed by the French and British people when they learned that the issue was at last joined and that there would be no more compromises nor peaceful acceptance of his aggression.
Looking back twenty-five years to the First World War.leads one who lived through it as a professional student and commentator to more thoughts than call possibly be expressed in an article, but there are OLle or two ideas in relation to it which are germane to this present inquiry. There has been in Britain and France, and quite clearly, too, in the British Empire, a movement favouring the present definition o( Allied war aims. The Allies had already announced that they would fight until the Na2i regime in Germany was ended, the aggressive conquests of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland redressed, and a new order of peace assured in Europe. The general aims could hardly be more clearly stated. But no hint even has yet been" given as to what exact concessions by Germany would satisfactorily establish a new order in Europe and guarantee liberty and democracy. The detailed ideas which would satisfactorily achieve the purposes of the Allies, many have felt, should be stated now, partly because they would make clearer, for the general public in the Allied countries exactly what the armies are fighting (or and partly in the hope that negotiations portance to sit around the peace table had not been foreseen. In the nature of things there was nothing to do but to begin all over agaIn.
Today this is of the first consequence. III particular it is pertinent to the folly of fighting a war solely against Hitler and Nazi Germany. The experience of the First World War demonstrated conclusively the impossibility of defining in advance anything more than the most general of general ideas about the end of the war. It is to be hoped that British and French liberals at home and in their empires will realize this before they force the governments to make declarations which can only become a source of misunderstanding and perhaps danger in the future. Indeed, a si tuation already exists which ought to make this utterly clear.
There is at present no accurate idea of who are now fighting the war, much less who will be fighting it at the end. There is no assurance whatever that the Allies are today lighting Hitler and Naziism alone. At the moment no one knows whether Russia is really neutral or secretly on the German side. No one knowsperhaps even Stalin does not himself know-whether Russia will not presently begin to attack Germany. The Soviet may not ally itself with Great Britain and France but. may nevertheless light Germany independently for reasons of its own. It may also be that the expectations earlier in this year of an alliance between the present Allies and the Soviet were not wholly without foundation. Until Russia's position can be positively determined, it is folly to announce the terms of peace with Germany alone on the assumption that the Allies are merely lighting Hitler. They may presently lind themselves fighting Germany and Russia, or they may lind Russia on their side. Either development will totally alter any terms of peace beyond any possible recognition.
Then there is Italy. All news from Rome describes a fervent popular determination to stay out of the war. The plans of the leaders have, however, been carefully concealed.
Much may happen, and much did in 1914 and 1915. Italy may quite conceivably decide to continue, or revive, the Berlin-Rome Axis (whichever statement represents the truth) and may thus join Hitler, or she may decide as in 1915 to desert it completely and join the Allies with all forces on land and sea . Today this is of the first consequence. III particular it is pertinent to the folly of fighting a war solely against Hitler and Nazi Germany. The experience of the First World War demonstrated conclusively the impossibility of defining in advance anything more than the most general of general ideas about the end of the war. It is to be hoped that British and French liberals at home and in their empires will realize this before they force the governments to make declarations which can only become a source of misunderstanding and perhaps danger in the future. Indeed, a si tuation already exists which ought to make this utterly clear.
Much may happen, and much did in 1914 and 1915. Italy may quite conceivably decide to continue, or revive, the Berlin-Rome Axis (whichever statement represents the truth) and may thus join Hitler, or she may decide as in 1915 to desert it completely and join the Allies with all forces on land and sea .
Then there is t he United States. Today she is neutral, and from the President down, app~ars determined to maintain neutrality. Opinio n in the United States, however, is by no means neutral, and certainly whatever happens the United States will not join Hitler. But she may join the Allies, and if she does, any war aims or ideas of peace drawn up without taking that [act into account will be utterly worthless. Until, in fact, the attitude towards the war of Russia, Italy, the United States, and perhaps a good many other nations, is defiO nitdy known, any attempt to define the terms of peace 'is folly. If the experience of the First Worlp War had not already proved the inexpediency of attempting to define war aims in advan ce, surely the present si tuation itself ought to do so. Naturally Hitler suffers from similar disabilities on his own side and is no more able under present circumstances to foresee what he will himself want to do within the next weeks than are the Allied statesmen ..
